Incident reporting systems are often used without a structured review process, limiting their utility to learn from defects and compromising their impact on improving the healthcare system. The objective of this study is to describe the experience of implementing a Comprehensive Management System (CMS) for incident reports in the ICU. A physician-led multidisciplinary Incident Report Committee was created to review, analyse and manage the department incident reports. New protocols, policies and procedures, and other patient safety interventions were developed as a result. Information was disseminated to staff through multiple avenues. We compared the pre-and post-intervention periods for the impact on the number of incident reports, level of harm, time needed to close reports and reporting individuals. A total of 1719 incidents were studied. ICUrelated incident reports increased from 20 to 36 incidents per 1000 patient days (P=0.01). After implementing the CMS, there was an increase in reporting 'no harm' from 14.2 to 28.1 incidents per 1000 patient days (P <0.001). There was a significant decrease in the time needed to close incident report after implementing the CMS (median of 70 days [Q1-Q3: 26-212] versus 13 days [Q1-Q3: 6-25, P<0.001]). A physician-led multidisciplinary CMS resulted in significant improvement in the output of the incident reporting system. This may be important to enhance the effectiveness of incident reporting systems in highlighting system defects, increasing learning opportunities and improving patient safety.
Key Words: Intensive Care Department, safety culture, quality control, critical care, administration, quality assurance, healthcare, culture, Saudi Arabia, incident report, medical errors, voluntary programs, systems analysis, hospital information systems Learning from defects in healthcare settings has been considered central to efforts aimed at improving patient safety and quality of care 1 . Similar to aviation and other high-risk industries, analysis of data from incident reports in healthcare can generate valuable information that may be utilised for system-based improvements [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] . This is particularly relevant in high-risk areas such as the intensive care unit (ICU), where the incidence of errors has been reported to be as high as two per patient per day; and where one in five patients sustain a serious adverse event 7 .
The process of incident reporting and management can be divided into four steps: reporting, review and analysis, management, and feedback and knowledge dissemination to the microsystem (frontline ICU staff) and to the macrosystem (the hospital). While previous studies have focused on the first step, i.e. reporting [8] [9] [10] , only a few studies have focused on the other three steps. Unlike other high-risk industries that have successful incident report review and investigation processes 3, 11, 12 , the focus in healthcare has often been on developing Incident Reporting Systems (IRSs) and monitoring the reporting rate 13 . However, only a few organisations have focused on structuring a comprehensive review and on an investigation process designed to improve learning from defects 2, 14 .
In our Intensive Care Department, we have initiated a Comprehensive Management System (CMS) for incident reports that integrates the four steps. In this pre-post study, we report the impact of the implementation of this IRS on the reporting rates, the nature of the reported incident, and the reported level of harm. We highlight the process of review and analysis and describe the timeliness of closing incident reports before and after intervention. We also describe examples of actions that were taken to manage incident reports and the feedback process to frontline staff.
Methods

Setting
This quality improvement project was conducted at the Intensive Care Department in King Abdulaziz Medical City, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, between 1 March 2010 and 28 February 2013. The hospital is a 900-bed university-affiliated tertiary care centre, is accredited by the Joint Commission International and is staffed by more than 10,000 employees from more than 50 nationalities. The Intensive Care Department encompasses a total of 60 beds in five ICUs and is staffed by onsite board-certified intensivists with residents and fellows. The average nurse-patient ratio is 1:1.
Pre-intervention incident reporting process
An electronic IRS (also called Safety Reporting System) was introduced in March 2010 as part of a hospital-wide project. The Quality Management Department (QMD) monitored incident reporting, the management process, and the incident report workflow, and provided training for frontline staff as well as for departments and unit managers.
An incident report was defined as a report of an undesired event that might affect a patient, employee, a family member, visitor, or equipment or property, and such an incident was not consistent with standard operations or care 6 . These events might cause actual injury, or might have potential to cause injury, loss of function or death.
In this system, reporting was voluntary, but not anonymous. Any employee involved in or who was an eyewitness of an incident was encouraged to initiate an incident report within 24 hours of the incident. The National Coordinating Council for Medication Error Reporting and Prevention Index was used to categorise the level of harm 15 . Once an incident report was generated, the QMD and the nurse manager of the involved unit reviewed the report independently, and directed it-as needed-to other units or departments. Physicians were involved in the review process as deemed necessary by the QMD. The incident report was closed based on the nurse manager's decision, and feedback on the resolutions was shared with the reporter if requested. 
The Comprehensive Management System
The CMS for Intensive Care Department incident reports was developed in November 2010 and included redesigning the process for review and analysis, management, and feedback of incident reports.
In the CMS, the review process was conducted by a physician-led multidisciplinary Incident Reports Committee (IRC) ( Figure 1 ). The lead physician was an intensive care registrar who was allocated 0.25 full-time equivalent (FTE) for safety and quality tasks, which included chairing the IRC. The committee included members from nursing, respiratory therapy, and pharmacy services as well as the QMD. The committee was charged with reviewing, analysing and closing of incident reports within five working days for intradepartmental incidents, and ten working days for interdepartmental incidents. The lead physician performed an initial review and stratification of the level of harm. Further investigation and review varied from Root Cause Analysis (RCA) for high-risk events (level of harm categories E-I) to just clarifying the events and the contributing factors by obtaining more details from the involved personnel.
Two tracks for incident management were developed based on the level of harm assessed by the IRC (Figure 1 ). Incident reports associated with 'harm' (categories E-I) were reported by the IRC chair to the Department Chairman who took corrective actions and/or formed special multidisciplinary taskforces to redesign existing processes. For incident reports with 'no harm' (categories A-D), the IRC liaised with key stakeholders (individuals, unit directors, nurse managers or other departments) to develop and implement the required actions as needed. The management of incidents was adapted from the Institute for Safe Medication Practices toolbox to prevent errors 16 , with the intention to select the 'more effective system-oriented' interventions.
Feedback to frontline staff was provided in several formats. Aggregate data about reporting rates and categories of incident reports were provided quarterly and presented to the staff in departmental meetings. Redesigned processes were communicated back to the staff in the form of revised policies, guidelines or executive communications ( Figure 1 ). Additionally, a weekly meeting, The Critical Care Quality and Safety Forum, was established to share important feedback from selected incident reports. This forum was used to discuss, critique and develop action plans. The Forum was also used to provide training on the use of the incident reporting electronic software. Additionally, various lectures were presented on the concept of 'just culture', on the trends and statistics of incident reports as well as on selected highrisk and sentinel events.
Analysis
We compared the pre-intervention period (March to October 2010) with the post-intervention period (November 2010 to February 2013) in the Intensive Care Department ( Figure 2 ).
The following data were extracted from the incident reports database, the Intensive Care Department database and from the hospital information system: number of incident reports and patient days for both the Intensive Care Department and for other inpatient areas. For Intensive Care Department-related incident reports, data on incident report categories, reporters and the level of harm were collected. The median time (in days) to close incident reports (defined as the time from the report submission date to closure date in days) was calculated for the Intensive Care Department and other inpatient areas as a comparator. For the Intensive Care Department-related incident reports, the time to close incident reports that did not require input from other departments (intradepartmental closure) and those that required input from other departments (interdepartmental closure) was also calculated.
Statistical analysis
We constructed run charts for the reporting rates (per 1000 patient days) of incident reports related to the Intensive Care Department and for those related to other inpatient areas and compared them using time series analysis. Similar run charts and analysis was carried out for the time to close incident reports. The pre-and post-intervention periods were compared using t-test or chi-square as appropriate. A P-value of <0.05 was considered significant.
Results
The Intensive Care Department-related incident reports increased from 20 to 36 per 1000 patient days (P=0.01), while in the other inpatient areas reports increased from 17 to 21 per 1000 patient days (P=0.006, Table 1 and Figure 3 ). The increase of Intensive Care Department-related incident reports was observed for both reports submitted by the Intensive Care Department staff (17.5 versus 28.8 incident reports per 1000 patient days, P <0.001) or non-Intensive Care Department staff (2.5 versus 7.2 incident reports per 1000 patient days, P <0.001). Similarly, an increase in reporting was observed whether reporting was made by non-physician Intensive Care Department staff (7.0 versus 27.7 incident reports per 1000 patient days, P <0.001), or by physicians (0.5 versus 1.1 incident reports per 1000 patient days, P=0.04, Table 2 ). The rates per 1000 patient days for most categories increased in the post-intervention period ( Table 2 ). After implementing the CMS, there was an increase in reporting 'no harm' incidents (level of harm A-D ) from 14.2 to 28.1 incident reports per 1000 patient days (P <0.001, Table 3 ). This was associated with no significant change in the rate of reporting 'harm' (level of harm E-I) incident reports (2.6 versus 2.1 incidents per 1000 patient days, P=0.39).
There was a significant decrease in the time to close incident reports after implementing the CMS from a median of 70 days (Q1-Q3: 26-212) to a median of 13 days (Q1-Q3: 6-25, P <0.001) ( Table 4 and Figure 4 ). This decrease was observed in both intra-departmental and inter-departmental incident reports (Table 4 ). Nevertheless, there was a significant difference between the two time series with a steeper decrease in the Intensive Care Department (P <0.0001). Table  5 summarises selected examples of incident reports.
Discussion
In this study, we presented a model for a CMS that utilised incident reports to learn from and improve system defects in critical care. The implementation of this system was associated with increased reporting, especially of 'no harm' incidents (categories A-D). In addition, the time needed to close incident reports decreased. The increase in reporting was more prominent in the Intensive Care Department compared to other inpatient areas, and therefore the observed change from the pre-to post-intervention cannot be explained based on the Hawthorne Effect alone.
As suggested by several studies on incident reporting process 11, 12, [17] [18] [19] , our approach shifts the attention of focus on reporting to a more integrated system that emphasises the steps of review and analysis, management, and feedback and dissemination. Unlike many aspects of clinical medicine, which are supported by evidence-based clinical practice guidelines, no such guidelines exist regarding IRSs best practice. In addition, the process of analysis can be complicated and costly, and many institutions do not invest enough to support this task 19 . Moreover, most previous research has focused on incident reporting rates, types 17 , barriers to reporting 20 , and contributing factors 4 . However, very few studies have demonstrated the key ingredients needed to shape the process of incident reporting review and analysis. Furthermore, the majority of those studies focused on the review and analysis of specific categories of incidents, such as critical incidents 12 and adverse events 21 , but not the lower level of harm and near-miss incidents. Motivated by the aviation and nuclear power industries, where standardised review and investigation of incidents is well established 11 , our study suggests a standardised method of review and analysis, management, and feedback and dissemination of incident reports.
Our approach suggests four key elements for successful CMS for incident reports: leadership support, physician engagement, a multidisciplinary approach, and leveraging various feedback and dissemination channels.
Leadership support is crucial [22] [23] [24] . By promoting incident reporting as a tool for patient safety and not as a punitive tool, staff are encouraged to report more safety opportunities. Additionally, the hospital leaders foster a culture of incident reporting by overseeing the process workflow, facilitating timely and effective actions and promoting open discussion and debate of errors.
Physician engagement is another key element. IRSs have Infection control incident: A resident was alerted by a nurse to wash his hands. However, he refused to comply with hand hygiene practice.
D
The incident was referred to the director of the residency program for investigation.
The nurses were empowered to stop and report any violation of safe practices. The concerned resident was asked to compile a written explanation of the event.
• Reminders • Education and information
• The case was discussed in the Critical Care Safety Forum and the staff were informed about the actions taken. • The reporter of the incident was debriefed.
Line or tube incident: A patient on the ward had a nasogastric tube misplaced into the lung followed by initiation of enteral feeding. As a result, the patient had massive aspiration, required intubation and ICU admission.
F
The incident was reported to the hospital management as a high-risk event.
The hospital management formed a multidisciplinary taskforce to perform a RCA immediately.
The taskforce developed a policy and procedure for evidence-based practice of nasogastric tube insertion and monitoring. This policy mandated a confirmation of the position of the tube before use. often been managed by nursing and QMD with limited physician involvement. This certainly was the case in our Intensive Care Department before the intervention, and in the rest of the hospital departments. However, physician engagement can significantly contribute to incident report management by fostering reporting culture and by providing clinical expertise 12 . Although reports by physicians constituted a small fraction of all reports, in both the pre-and postintervention periods, consistent with what was observed in other studies 25, 26 we observed a modest increase in physician reporting.
The third important element is the multidisciplinary approach, which ensures the contribution of all stakeholders involved in the care of critically ill patients to facilitate better prioritisation, classification and streamlining of event analysis.
The fourth element is leveraging various feedback and dissemination channels, which are essential to improve reliability and safety in healthcare 17 . The lack of feedback has been reported to be a major barrier to reporting for doctors and nurses 25 . Sharing information helps foster transparency and ownership over the redesigned processes and patientsafety initiatives.
Measuring the outcome of complex intervention such as IRS in a social adoptive system like the Intensive Care Department is quite challenging. Measurement of reporting rate is often used as a surrogate for effective and transparent reporting. We have previously described our paper-based incident reporting system, which had a reporting rate of 5.8 per 1000 patient days in the Intensive Care Department and a similar rate in the rest of the hospital 5 . Our reporting rates increased substantially with the implementation of an electronic system, which is consistent with what has been described by other studies 17, 27 . We noted a further increment in reporting after implementing our intervention along with reduction in the time to close incident reports. The increase in reporting is probably related to improvement in the reporting culture and to the positive reinforcement due to timely closure and feedback of the reporting process. Timeliness in closing incident reports is essential in utilising the knowledge gained to drive change quickly and also in gaining staff confidence in the process. Measuring the effectiveness of this intervention on patient outcomes is much more difficult. We described several examples of how knowledge gained was used to redesign important processes in response to incident reports. Our study has some potential limitations. First, our study depended on voluntary reporting, which can be imperfect when it comes to capturing all errors and safety events. Second, we did not measure whether the CMS had improved the safety at the Intensive Care Department, as this is the ultimate goal of our intervention. We used a pragmatic definition for closure of incident reports based on the decision of the incident report reviewers, since there is no agreed-upon definition. The shorter time to close incident reports observed in the post-intervention period is associated with the new process of review, although some of the differences may be related to change in the criteria or to increasing production pressures. Finally, because our intervention was multifaceted, we are unable to evaluate if certain components of the intervention were more or less effective than others and whether similar effects could be achieved with different or less resources. Cost-effective analysis of implementing IRSs has not been studied before, and our study did not include such analysis either.
Conclusion
A multidisciplinary CMS led by physicians resulted in a significant improvement in the output of our incident reporting system. Patient safety projects should utilise the lessons learned from such data to prioritise improvement strategies and guide resource allocation. Further studies should be considered to measure the effectiveness of implementing this intervention in terms of better patient outcomes and safer systems.
